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By William D. Henderson
and Rachel M. Zahorsky
ohn, a senior associate at a regional law firm,
read the recruiter's email a second time, still
in disbelief.
An experienced litigator, John (who asked not
to be identified out of concern for future job pros-
pects) graduated in the top 10 percent of his law
school class in 2006 with a resum6 that boasted
the brass rings of law review and moot court,
where he won numerous awards. His undergraduate GPA
was equally stellar, and in the past six years he'd run numer-
ous litigation matters. His annual billed hours remained in
the top 5 percent of his firm.
Yet, according to the message, his legal career hinged on
a single factor: the name of his second-tier law school.
"We don't typically recruit from [school X]," the recruiter
wrote, noting that John's pre-law-school professional back-
ground would be the sole reason the firm might reconsider
in the future. "Well pass."
John's experience is far from isolated. Decades after
graduation, elite law school degrees continue to open doors
closed to graduates of less-favored schools. Prestige drives
a huge proportion of law firm hiring, judicial clerkships,
and coveted positions at the U.S. Department of Justice
and within the legal academy.
In contrast, law degrees from lower-ranked schools can
create enormous uphill struggles for even the most talented
and determined lawyers. A student from a nonelite law
school may still get a foot in the door with high marks, but
very few opportunities go to law students just because their
schools more effectively develop core skills and knowledge
or adopt innovative curricula or teaching methods.
'There was such a panic among my classmates regarding
the ranking of our school and how it would impact job pros-
pects," says Niko Marneris, who transferred to Chicago-Kent
College of Law after ranking in the top of his class at John
Marshall College of Law in Chicago as a 1L. "The move 100
percent came down to fear of having a diploma from a lower-
ranked versus a higher-ranked school."
Marneris gave up opportunities for law review and a 3.9
GPA when he made the switch.
"I thought that for the rest of my career I'd have this black
mark, despite the great reputation of graduates from my
school among local judges and lawyers," he says. "Being in
practice now as a solo, I could not have been more wrong."
BRAND BIAS
Snobbism and elitism are the last socially acceptable prej-
udices. If law school rankings accurately foretold lawyer
success, there'd be good reason for thousands of law gradu-
ates to be demoralized. But statistics have shown decidedly
that they don't. Instead, the preference toward the so-called
elite is largely rooted in vanity and identity.
John's experience is no different from Philip Corboy's
being shut out of Chicago's LaSalle Street firms for being
Catholic, Sandra Day O'Connor's having been rejected by
the Arizona corporate bar because she is a woman, or Joseph
Flom's being snubbed by top firms because he was Jewish.
This near obsession with pedigree is not only paralyzing to
the career prospects of individual lawyers; it is damaging to
the entire profession. Legal educators, engulfed in turmoil
over skyrocketing tuition rates and dwindling job prospects
for graduates, have little incentive to change when oppor-
tunities for their students are determined largely through
letters of admission rather than the substance and quality
of the education provided.
Yet the legal profession is in dire need of fresh ideas
and broader skills for lawyers to effectively adapt to the
changes brought on by technology, economic duress and
globalization.
Most students, lawyers and law professors get hung up on
how much a great legal education costs in terms of time and
money. But the more important question is this: How much
is it worth to them and to the profession?
The most recognized measure of law school prestige is pro-
vided by U.S. News & World Report in its annual rankings,
which nearly perfectly correlate with the academic achieve-
ments of the entering classes. The formula places heavy
emphasis on Law School Admission Test scores and grade
point averages, implying that the quality of legal education
output is based on the quality of input.
This system and the current market fail to discern between
a legal education done well versus one done poorly. As firms
face economic stagnation and fight over market share, hiring
Ivy Leaguers without a passion for corporate law or BigLaw
becomes an economic tax.
ELITE HISTORY
The brands of elite law schools were created decades
before U.S. News published its first college rankings in 1983.
One thread that binds the elite law schools is nearly a cen-
tury of allegiance among the nation's corporate law firms.
The lawyers who counseled the nation's great industrial
and financial enterprises of the early 20th century suffered
an enormous imbalance between the needs of their clients
and the availability of lawyers with suitable experience and
training. In the early 1900s, very few law students enjoyed
the prospect of paid employment upon graduation. New law-
yers moved into independent practice and relied on loose
affiliations with more experienced attorneys. They overcame
inexperience at the expense of their unknowing, unsophisti-
cated clients. A supply of top-quality lawyers simply did not
exist; it needed to be created.
The most successful of corporate law firms adapted to this
business climate by hiring promising law school graduates
and embedding them into their own training system, which
over several years supplied inductees with a well-rounded
and complete skill set that could be deployed for the benefit
of clients.
The most famous training program was implemented
by Paul Cravath, the brilliant business lawyer who went on
to build the white-shoe firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore.
According to the firm's history, published eight years after
Cravath's death in 1948, the primary purpose of the Cravath
system was to create "a better lawyer faster."
One key operational question of this training model was
entry-level hiring. Cravath and his contemporaries favored
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"If you remember nothing else from this trial, ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, remember this: I have a law
degree from Yale."
graduates of a handful of Ivy League schools-namely
Harvard, Columbia and Yale-and so-called national law
schools, including the universities of Virginia and Michigan,
for the coveted training positions.
These schools had several advantages: They required
extensive undergraduate education, their courses of study
were full time and taught by scholarly faculty, and they
tended to admit students well-connected to the commercial
world.
Between 1950 and 1965, 73 percent of lawyers hired in
large New York City law firms attended Harvard, Yale or
Columbia, according to professors Richard Sander at UCLA
School of Law and Jane Yakowitz at Brooklyn Law School.
Though by 2002 this percentage dropped to 15 percent, that
is more because of the relatively small pool of such elite-
school graduates.
The stratification of the corporate bar also extended to the
industrial heartland; 73 percent of lawyers in Detroit also
went to one of five national schools: Harvard, Yale, Colum-
bia, or the universities of Chicago or Michigan, according to
professor and sociologist Jack Ladinsky of the University of
Wisconsin Law School.
Today, the largest U.S. law firms compete for the highest
possible percentage of hires among elite law school gradu-
ates to signal a place in the pecking order of firm prestige.
BUYING THE BRAND
Although often perceived as a bastion of left-leaning edu-
cators allied against the corporate establishment, the legal
academy has adopted a brand sensitivity that mirrors corpo-
rate America.
This is true even among law schools in the middle or
bottom of the U.S. News rankings that place few, if any,
graduates in large corporate law firms.
Similar to the corporate bar, the legal academy's devotion
to elite educational credentials can be traced to prevalent
historical conditions. In efforts to limit indiscriminate
entry into the practice of law and elevate the status of
the profession, the American Bar Association and the
Association of American Law Schools lobbied state
legislatures for lawyer licensing regimes that required
higher levels of formal education.
By the mid-1920s, the die of educational quality was
almost fully formed and the case method, originally created
at Harvard Law School, became the touchstone of modern
legal education. Bar exams were soon modeled on curricula
taught at the national law schools. And in 1948, the LSAT
appeared for the first time.
'Wherever one looked ... the change was on. Any uni-
versity president wishing to have a first-rate law school
had to subscribe," said historian Robert Stevens in his
book Law School: Legal Education in America from the
1850s to the 1980s.
Institutions signaled their commitment to modern legal
education by hiring deans and faculty members with cre-
dentials from Harvard or similar elite institutions, who
replicated the teaching methods and academic norms
of their alma maters.
However, law schools may soon be forced to reconcile
whether today's homogenous faculty hiring practices reflect a
refusal to be dynamic and receptive to change, says Vander-
bilt University Law School professor Tracey E. George, who
along with University of Toronto law professor Albert Yoon
has studied the hiring patterns of U.S. law schools.
"The rub for some is that if we continue to hire professors
who look exactly like existing ones, we aren't introducing
innovative practices and methodologies," George says. "The
question is whether law schools can innovate within that
group or need to diversify faculty portfolios; and if they do,
will that diversity translate to students in the classroom?"
THE 'ASSOCIATIVE GOODS' APPROACH
There is little evidence that legal employers or law profes-
sors believe elite law schools provide a substantially better
legal education. Rather, the vaunted status is largely attrib-
utable to the provision of "associative goods": the personal
attributes and characteristics of other customers who are
buying the same product or service, according to Yale Law
School professor and economist Henry Hansmann.
Associative goods are particularly common in higher edu-
cation because students exert a strong influence on the social
and educational experience, marriage prospects, and future
personal and professional reputations of their peers.
"In short," Hansmann wrote in a 1999 essay, "the thing
that a college or university is selling its students is, in large
part, its other students." As a result, educational quality and
price become secondary factors in the decision to enroll.
Hansmann's theory may explain the persistent dominance
of elite law schools, yet the underlying composition of the
associative goods has changed meaningfually over time.
In the 1920s and '30s, graduates of elite law schools
tended to be white male Protestants from upper-class
families. With the advent of standardized admission tests
and affirmative action, law school doors slowly opened to
a broader demographic that was deemed to be a diverse
and academically able elite.
But the rise of the U.S. News rankings has caused law
schools to narrowly focus on the academic credentials of
38 ABA JOURNAL July 2012 ILLUSTRATIONS BY TOM GIANNI
each entering class and drastically
reduce the weight formerly given to
personal statements, work experi-
ence and letters of recommendation.
It has also significantly affected stu-
dent preferences. Yale's rate of offers
to acceptances increased from 50
percent to 80 percent in the early
to mid-1990s, a statistic Hansmann
attributes to Yale's consistent No. 1
status in the rankings.
This transformation changed the
associative goods from those most
able in the eyes of admissions com-
mittees to those with the highest
LSAT scores and GPAs, stripping
virtually all human judgment from
determinations of academic merit.
And the prevalence of belief in
associative goods may explain why the
hiring factor second in importance for
many firms and clients (after duration
of experience) is where that law-
yer graduated from law school, says
Mark Britton, founder and president
of Avvo, a Seattle company that rates
lawyers and other professionals.
Since Avvo's creation, Britton's
team has culled data from thou-
sands of lawyers and clients through
surveys, focus groups and usability
tests, some of which use computer-
mounted cameras to detect eye
movements of both lawyers and con-
sumers as they scan attorney resumes,
a telling sign of what each finds most
important.
"Among the dozens of things on a
lawyer's resum6," says Britton, 'law
school is one of those shortcuts or sig-
nals used to judge experience, quality
and affinity. In addition to expertise,
hiring partners and consumers look
at resume's for common elements and
to better gauge whether that person
is someone they can relate to. Those
are the two biggest reasons the brain
moves to thinking about school."
That's another powerful indicator
of the successful branding campaigns
of the nation's elite law schools.
TWO THEORIES
One way to assess the legal market's
skepticism toward legal education is
to consider two theories and ascertain
which is closer to the truth.
In Theory 1, a person's potential as
a lawyer can be accurately measured
by GPAs and LSAT scores; thus the
input-based market for educational
quality is rational and makes sense.
It all boils down to raw smarts. It's a
paradigm supported by the broader
U.S. cultural belief that innate talent
drives success.
Theory 2 hypothesizes that three
years of extraordinary legal educa-
tion confer a long-term competitive
advantage that accelerates a student's
career and benefits employers and
society.
But there is a limited market for
high-quality legal education defined
outside the parameters set by the
current rankings and college accred-
itation standards. Few law schools
and faculty are willing to differentiate
themselves based on their teaching
techniques rather than their academic
scholarship, particularly when school
rank depends on the constant churn
of law review articles-no matter how
esoteric or irrelevant the topic.
Students vetted through the rank-
ings-era admissions process are now
midcareer professionals who hold
positions of influence in major law
firms and law schools. They strongly
adhere to law school brands in their
own hiring practices. This promotes
Theory 1.
And when the associative nature
of legal education is so powerful, legal
employers largely ignore claims of
superior educational quality, and law
professors don't waste their energies
on ambitious curricular endeavors.
Many quarters of the profession
have adopted a cramped view of how
much legal education can accomplish.
Whatever competitive advantage
might be conferred by world-class
teaching, the conventional wisdom
of Theory 1 concludes, it will eventu-
ally be eclipsed by a few IQ points.
'There is a lot of innovation in
legal education today," says David N.
Yellen, dean of Loyola University Chi-
cago School of Law. "Unfortunately,
legal employers don't reward law
schools for the quality of their edu-
cational innovation. Firms tend to
decide where to interview based on
where partners went to school or the
school's reputation based on things
like the US. News rankings.
"It would be great if employ-
ers really got to know their area law
schools, and weighed in on who they
think is doing a good job of actually
preparing students for the practice of
law by interviewing and hiring more
of those schools' graduates."
" Creativit/inovaio
"aticu gm thpstos neit
stResearcinos rot teeegl om unty
the theories are largely empirical ques-
tions that can be evaluated with hard data.
Social science literature is replete with
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"Your credentials are impeccable, Ms. Schmidt, but
it is against firm policy to hire anyone who has attended
a law school they can actually afford."
examples of how brainpower predicts job performance, but
that predictive power carries much less punch in occupations
made up of high-ability people. According to University of
California at Berkeley education professor Arthur Jensen,
who is sometimes cast as an IQ fundamentalist, differences
in the upper part of the IQ scale "are generally of lesser
importance for success in the popular sense than are certain
traits of personality and character."
These findings are consistent with a recent landmark
study of thousands of lawyers and law students conducted
by UC Berkeley professors Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon
Zedeck: Identification, Development and Validation of
Predictors for Successful Lawyering.
Drawing upon the techniques of industrial psychology,
Shultz and Zedeck identified 26 competencies that form the
basis for effective lawyering. Using behaviorally anchored
rating scales that had been empirically developed, peers
and supervisors were asked to evaluate the skills of 1,105
law alumni of UC Berkeley and UC Hastings, ranging from
two to 35 years of practice experience, and approximately
200 students.
Remarkably, LSAT scores, undergraduate GPA and first-
year law school grades (the basis for a significant portion
of hiring decisions) were positively correlated at statisti-
cally significant levels with only six to eight of the 26 success
factors, depending upon the subtest. The strongest correla-
tions (albeit still only moderate) were to abilities associated
with the traditional law school curriculum, such as writing,
researching law, and engaging in analysis and reasoning.
Further, within the alumni sample, higher LSAT scores
and first-year grades were negatively correlated with net-
working, serving the community and business development.
In the student sample, high undergraduate GPAs were
positively correlated with no effectiveness factors, but
negatively associated with practical judgment, the ability
to see the world through the eyes of others, skill in devel-
oping relationships, living with integrity and honesty, and
Ale
'
Also causing difficulty for Theory 1 are the results of the
many interschool trial advocacy competitions in which
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contributions of community service. Similarly, high LSAT
scores were negatively associated with networking and
business development.
The Shultz-Zedeck study contained other surprises.
Although traditional measures had limited power in predict-
ing lawyer effectiveness, a variety of other psychometric tests
were positively correlated at statistically significant levels
with many of the 26 lawyer effectiveness factors. These tests
focused on personality attributes, structured questions about
biographical information, situational judgment and a candi-
date's motivations, values and preferences.
A Law School Admissions Council committee origi-
nally funded the Shultz-Zedeck study to explore alternative
admission criteria that could be empirically tied to lawyer
effectiveness but lacked the persistent test performance gap
for many minority subgroups. In evaluating why the various
achievement tests added little predictive power to law school
grades (beyond what is already predicted by GPA and LSAT
scores), the authors acknowledged that a large proportion
of the lawyer effectiveness factors are seldom taught or for-
mally assessed in law school.
"It's very hard cognitively for admissions committees to
balance fairly something that purports to be an objective
statement of performance and then a fuzzy letter of recom-
mendation," Shultz says. "It's hard not to be pulled in by the
apparently precise LSAT and GPA numbers."
"The de facto LSAT score doubles and triples the odds
of admission when GPA and college major among two
applicants are the same. However, very few people have
focused on the fact the LSAT itself says it only tries to
predict three things: analytic reasoning, logical reasoning
and reading skills," she says. "While I certainly want lawyers
to be skilled at those things, nobody has asked whether if
you know about a candidate's logic and analytical skills, do
you know all you need to know to evaluate them for entering
the legal profession?"
NEW FRONTIER?
Gradually, a significant number of legal educators and
professionals are beginning to unite around the findings
of the Shultz-Zedeck study. One reason for the interest is
the growing belief that the legal profession's ignorance or
neglect of a broad base of lawyer competencies represents a
whole new frontier for legal education. Moreover, it reflects
an opportunity for an ambitious law school to create a model
of legal education that goes beyond the case method and
teaches competencies such as teamwork, emotional intel-
ligence, leadership, decision-making (based on empirical
psychology) and communication with clients.
"One of the clear dangers of hiring based largely on
prestige of school attended and grades is the potential
resegregation of the upper levels of a highly stratified
profession," Shultz warns. "Although clients press for
diversity among legal counsel, law firms fail to consider
many potentially effective minority lawyers because not
many underrepresented minority students graduate from
top schools with top grades."
This may revitalize Theory 2, the view that a great
education can provide a lifelong competitive advantage
that is distinct and separable from raw intelligence.
teams from more than 100 law schools compete in simulated
trial exercises that progress from a regional format to the
National Trial Competition. Since its inception in 1986,
a handful of teams has dominated the league tables,
including Stetson (five-time winner), Northwestern (four-
time winner), Chicago-Kent (three-time) and Temple
(three-time). The trial teams are judged blind; law school
affiliations are not revealed until the end of the tournament.
The appearance of top-tiered Northwestern Law with
tier-two Temple and Chicago-Kent and tier-three Stetson
suggests incoming credentials do not preordain perfor-
mance as a lawyer. And the repeat appearance of a handful
of schools suggests expert coaching and practice-a form of
legal education-may be the real linchpin of excellent court-
room advocacy. This strikes quite a blow for Theory I and
provides at least some support for Theory 2.
Meanwhile, though the raw-intelligence view of Theory
1 may have many adherents, the most difficult data points
to explain are those that are exceptions to the rule. These
include the lawyer with sterling credentials who fails to
achieve professional prominence-place here any name you
know that fits. Then there is the regional law school graduate
who becomes an icon in the field, like former SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt, the St. John's University School of Law graduate
who built one of the largest securities practices in New York.
The most experienced law firm headhunters are familiar
with this seeming paradox. It is far from rare.
GROWTH MINDSET
The limited predictive power of Theory I may be partially
explained by the research of Stanford professor Carol Dweck,
one of the nation's leading cognitive psychologists. Dweck's
research focuses on the concept of "self-theories."
According to Dweck, self-theories can be divided into two
groups: Those with a fixed mindset believe talent and ability
are largely determined by genetic endowment. In contrast,
those with a growth mindset believe one can substantially
change one's abilities and intelligence through focused effort
and learning.
Self-theories affect our choices and behavior. According
to Dweck's research, people with a fixed mindset tend to
prefer activities that validate their abilities. They shy away
from tasks that may provide the world with evidence that
they lack innate talent. In contrast, people with a growth
mindset believe they can acquire important skills, knowledge
and abilities through effort. So floundering at a task is not
failure-it's learning.
The two mindsets evaluate opportunities very differently
and thus tend to accumulate different life experiences.
Psychology has amassed mountains of evidence that
people have a tendency to overestimate their own abili-
ties. To determine whether the deception varies by mindset
type, Dweck and her colleagues collected self-assessments
of ability and compared them with objective measures of
performance. Growth-mindset people had a near-perfect
correlation between self-perceptions and their performance.
Fixed-mindset people accounted for virtually all of the exag-
gerated self-perception.
Dweck explains, "If, like those with the growth mind-
set, you believe you can develop yourself, then you're open
to accurate information about your current abilities, even
if it's unflattering. What's more, if you're oriented toward
learning ... you need accurate information about your abili-
ties in order to learn effectively. However, if everything is
either good news or bad news about your previous traits-as
it is with fixed-mindset people-distortion always inevitably
enters the picture."
Who is most at risk to suffer from the fixed mindset?
According to Dweck, those who obtain high standardized
test scores at a young age and become addicted to the adula-
tion and praise. Thereafter, all their efforts become narrowly
focused on academic achievement.
Does this sound like any lawyer you know?
The final irony of the fixed mindset is that it can be
cured-through education on self-theories and the impli-
cations of affirmatively choosing the growth mindset.
TIME FOR CHANGE
It is worth recalling today that Paul Cravath's common-
sense commitment to lawyer education and development
provided the blueprint for the successful law firm of the
20th century.
Innovation and change in legal education have stalled
badly because law firms, law professors and law students
have leaned too heavily on Theory 1, which places too great
a weight on academic pedigree and unduly discounts the
power of education to build careers and transform lives.
"Schools like ours, and probably all law schools, have to
start from this premise: The rankings system is what it is,
and it's quite powerful right now," says University of Tulsa
law dean Janet Levit, whose school advanced 48 places in
the U.S. News rankings in the past three years. As a result,
the law school saw an instant boost in applications-from six
received the day before the 2013 U.S. News rankings release
to 23, and 19 applications in the next two days. (Levit hopes
law firms will also take note of the jump during on-campus
interviews this fall.)
Although the school made strides to lower student-faculty
ratios and improve median LSAT and GPA scores through
smaller entering-class sizes and selective faculty hiring,
Levit sees the school's rise in the rankings as long-awaited
due recognition.
"It's impossible to say whether the education is better or
whether we are 48 spots better," she acknowledges. "All I
can say is our rank is finally catching up with the on-the-
ground reality."
As the law profession undergoes a major structural trans-
formation, it needs assessment based on reality. It needs law
professors with a faith in a better way of educating lawyers.
It also needs employers who are willing to consider the value
of these innovations with fresh eyes.
Absent this maneuver, there is no market for high-quality
legal education, only a crude sorting system based on apti-
tude tests and law school brands.
It all comes back to that most important question: How
much is an excellent law school education worth to students
and the profession? Once we know the answer to this ques-
tion, we will know how to focus our efforts. U]
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